

STAT

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200110009-0

Approved For Release 2005/01/10 : CIA-RDP86B00985R000200110009-0

**CONFIDENTIAL**

4 August 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI

FROM:

SUBJECT: The Director's Dinners, Progress Report

1. Assumptions:

a. That the DCI's objectives are as follows:

(1) to inform himself on important intelligence issues and the authorities on same, both from within the Agency and from outside;

(2) to stimulate investigation of neglected subjects;

(3) to explore differences on strongly controverted subjects;

(4) to set an example that will encourage the appropriate divisions of CIA to seek the assistance (and stimulus) of information, perspectives, and methods of analysis developed on the outside.

(5) To encourage outside authorities to share their knowledge and insights on important subjects with the national intelligence community.

(6) To expand his knowledge of the CIA analytic staff, and their understanding of his objectives.

b. That the dinners should be arranged as follows:

(1) Maximum frequency one each six weeks.

(2) Participation: Not more than 12, including the DCI, invited authorities from outside (Government and non-Government), and interested insiders.

(3) That origination, scheduling, and format should be kept flexible but that the more usual course will be as follows:

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IMPDET CL

25X1


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(a) Office directors and NIOs will be invited to identify subjects well in advance and to agree to scheduling of dinner meetings when timely in view both of outside and inside developments.

(b) Outside participants will be nominated and invited (after nominations are approved) by the initiating offices.

(c) Preparatory work should normally include brief papers (with informative executive summaries) which, depending on the circumstance, may be prepared by visitors from outside, by CIA analysts, or by both.

(d) CIA participants may include office and division directors (or their deputies) as appropriate, the D/DCI/NI, and the relevant NIO. But emphasis should be on participation of the analyst (or analysts), NIO, or others primarily concerned with the subject.

(4) That the program will be developed and monitored by the O/DCI/NI; that actual arrangements for specific meetings (including detailed scheduling, security, travel and accommodation of out-of-town participants and their reimbursement) will be handled by the Coordinator for Academic Relations and External Analytic Support  and his staff.

25X1

(5) That the dinners will be held in the DCI Executive Dining Room with discussions in the DCI Conference Room or other facilities nearby; that alcoholic drinks may be served; and that costs will be met from DCI funds.

(6) That meetings will normally begin (with drinks) at 6:30; dinner will be scheduled for 7:00 or 7:30 and will be followed by discussion until 9:30 or 10:00; sessions may be classified or unclassified, depending on the subjects discussed, the participants, or other controlling circumstances.

2. Prospective Subjects:

The following have been discussed with individuals and offices as indicated.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CONFIDENTIAL**

ILLEGIB

25X1

a. Social factors controlling population change.  
[redacted] is exploring willingness of [redacted] to discuss this subject at a dinner meeting in the near future. OER analysts would be logical CIA participants but Ernst says none are authorities (both he and his deputy were very skeptical on this subject).

25X1

b. Multilateral corporations as intelligence sources and consumers. This is [redacted] nomination. He says he would be happy to develop it.

25X1

c. U.S. Government support for a Soviet research institute. This is another [redacted] nomination on which he volunteers to carry the ball. The problem is that funds are disappearing for research and training in the Soviet-East European field. [redacted] says there is a recognized need for an Executive Branch action group to work with the academics on the development of an institutional setting that will permit federal funds, with Congressional blessing, to be used to sustain this important field of inquiry.

25X1

25X1

25X1

g. Technology transfers (East-West and/or North-South). This is an OSI suggestion.

h. Political and economic developments in the Persian Gulf countries. This is another OER suggestion based on work its analysts are doing and on contributions from [redacted]

25X1

i. Verification risks acceptable to prospective violators of arms control measures. This is an OSR [redacted] suggestion. The point is that the assurance of verification is usually approached as a problem for the innocent, but the innocent (i.e., the U.S.) should also have some understanding of the risks a prospective violator of agreements might regard as acceptable in various circumstances. This looks like a good one on which one or more of the various academic arms control centers might have something to contribute.

25X1

25X1